SafeStack documentation improvements

[ksvladimir]

Summary

This patch makes the following improvements to the SafeStack documentation:

• Explicitly states the security guarantees of the SafeStack
• Clarifies which of the security guarantees are probabilistic
• Re-orders security limitations to put the most severe ones first
• Explains how `__attribute__((no_sanitize("safe-stack")))` works and how to use it safely
• Explains that SafeStack should be combined with a forward-edge protection mechanism, such as CPI, IFCC or others
• Multiple readability and stylistic improvements

[ksvladimir]

Updated to include the cfe-commits list as a subscriber.

[jfb]

docs/SafeStack.rst

107 ↗

(On Diff #28102)

"may be not complete yet" is pretty awkward phrasing.

111 ↗

(On Diff #28102)

I'd strengthen this last statement: at the moment safe stack assumes that the compiler's implementation is correct. This has not been verified except through code inspection, and could always regress in the future. It's therefore desirable to have a separate static or dynamic binary analysis / checker.

[ksvladimir]

Addressed feedback by jfb:

• Rephrased some ugly language
• Stressed the need for end-to-end verification of SafeStack instrumentation

[ksvladimir]

Thanks for the comments! I've addressed them in the updated patch.

docs/SafeStack.rst

107 ↗

(On Diff #28102)

I've rephrased this and the previous paragraphs to make it sound less awkward.

111 ↗

(On Diff #28102)

Great point! I think it applies to the entire SafeStack instrumentation, not just the hiding aspect, hence I added this note at the end of the Security Limitations section.

[jfb]

lgtm. I'll leave final signoff up to @pcc.

[pcc]

LGTM

Do you have commit access?

docs/SafeStack.rst

177 ↗

(On Diff #28222)

Nit: Integrity

[ksvladimir]

Thanks a lot for the review! No, I do not have commit access, please feel free to commit on my behalf.

[ksvladimir]

Fixed a typo Integirty -> Integrity

docs/SafeStack.rst

177 ↗

(On Diff #28222)

Fixed.

[pcc]

Committed. Please do consider requesting commit access (http://llvm.org/docs/DeveloperPolicy.html#obtaining-commit-access) if you anticipate contributing further to the project.

cfe/trunk/docs/SafeStack.rst

 
 SafeStack is an instrumentation pass that protects programs against attacks
 based on stack buffer overflows, without introducing any measurable performance
 overhead. It works by separating the program stack into two distinct regions:
 the safe stack and the unsafe stack. The safe stack stores return addresses,
 register spills, and local variables that are always accessed in a safe way,
 while the unsafe stack stores everything else. This separation ensures that
 buffer overflows on the unsafe stack cannot be used to overwrite anything
-on the safe stack, which includes return addresses.
+on the safe stack.
+
+SafeStack is a part of the `Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI) Project
+<http://dslab.epfl.ch/proj/cpi/>`_.
 
 Performance
 -----------
 
 The performance overhead of the SafeStack instrumentation is less than 0.1% on
 average across a variety of benchmarks (see the `Code-Pointer Integrity
 <http://dslab.epfl.ch/pubs/cpi.pdf>`_ paper for details). This is mainly
 because most small functions do not have any variables that require the unsafe
 stack and, hence, do not need unsafe stack frames to be created. The cost of
 creating unsafe stack frames for large functions is amortized by the cost of
 executing the function.
 
 In some cases, SafeStack actually improves the performance. Objects that end up
 being moved to the unsafe stack are usually large arrays or variables that are
 used through multiple stack frames. Moving such objects away from the safe
 stack increases the locality of frequently accessed values on the stack, such
 as register spills, return addresses, and small local variables.
 
-Limitations
------------
-
-SafeStack has not been subjected to a comprehensive security review, and there
-exist known weaknesses, including but not limited to the following.
-
-In its current state, the separation of local variables provides protection
-against stack buffer overflows, but the safe stack itself is not protected
-from being corrupted through a pointer dereference. The Code-Pointer
-Integrity paper describes two ways in which we may protect the safe stack:
-hardware segmentation on the 32-bit x86 architecture or information hiding
-on other architectures.
-
-Even with information hiding, the safe stack would merely be hidden
-from attackers by being somewhere in the address space. Depending on the
-application, the address could be predictable even on 64-bit address spaces
-because not all the bits are addressable, multiple threads each have their
-stack, the application could leak the safe stack address to memory via
-``__builtin_frame_address``, bugs in the low-level runtime support etc.
-Safe stack leaks could be mitigated by writing and deploying a static binary
-analysis or a dynamic binary instrumentation based tool to find leaks.
-
-This approach doesn't prevent an attacker from "imbalancing" the safe
-stack by say having just one call, and doing two rets (thereby returning
-to an address that wasn't meant as a return address). This can be at least
-partially mitigated by deploying SafeStack alongside a forward control-flow
-integrity mechanism to ensure that calls are made using the correct calling
-convention. Clang does not currently implement a comprehensive forward
-control-flow integrity protection scheme; there exists one that protects
-:doc:`virtual calls <ControlFlowIntegrity>` but not non-virtual indirect calls.
-
 Compatibility
 -------------
 
 Most programs, static libraries, or individual files can be compiled
 with SafeStack as is. SafeStack requires basic runtime support, which, on most
 platforms, is implemented as a compiler-rt library that is automatically linked
 in when the program is compiled with SafeStack.
 
 Linking a DSO with SafeStack is not currently supported.
 
 Known compatibility limitations
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 Certain code that relies on low-level stack manipulations requires adaption to
 work with SafeStack. One example is mark-and-sweep garbage collection
 implementations for C/C++ (e.g., Oilpan in chromium/blink), which must be
 changed to look for the live pointers on both safe and unsafe stacks.
 
-SafeStack supports linking together modules that are compiled with and without
-SafeStack, both statically and dynamically. One corner case that is not
-supported is using ``dlopen()`` to load a dynamic library that uses SafeStack into
-a program that is not compiled with SafeStack but uses threads.
+SafeStack supports linking statically modules that are compiled with and
+without SafeStack. An executable compiled with SafeStack can load dynamic
+libraries that are not compiled with SafeStack. At the moment, compiling
+dynamic libraries with SafeStack is not supported.
 
 Signal handlers that use ``sigaltstack()`` must not use the unsafe stack (see
 ``__attribute__((no_sanitize("safe-stack")))`` below).
 
 Programs that use APIs from ``ucontext.h`` are not supported yet.
 
+Security
+--------
+
+SafeStack protects return addresses, spilled registers and local variables that
+are always accessed in a safe way by separating them in a dedicated safe stack
+region. The safe stack is automatically protected against stack-based buffer
+overflows, since it is disjoint from the unsafe stack in memory, and it itself
+is always accessed in a safe way. In the current implementation, the safe stack
+is protected against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities though
+randomization and information hiding: the safe stack is allocated at a random
+address and the instrumentation ensures that no pointers to the safe stack are
+ever stored outside of the safe stack itself (see limitations below).
+
+Known security limitations
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A complete protection against control-flow hijack attacks requires combining
+SafeStack with another mechanism that enforces the integrity of code pointers
+that are stored on the heap or the unsafe stack, such as `CPI
+<http://dslab.epfl.ch/proj/cpi/>`_, or a forward-edge control flow integrity
+mechanism that enforces correct calling conventions at indirect call sites,
+such as `IFCC <http://research.google.com/pubs/archive/42808.pdf>`_ with arity
+checks. Clang has control-flow integrity protection scheme for `C++ virtual
+calls <ControlFlowIntegrity>`, but not non-virtual indirect calls. With
+SafeStack alone, an attacker can overwrite a function pointer on the heap or
+the unsafe stack and cause a program to call arbitrary location, which in turn
+might enable stack pivoting and return-oriented programming.
+
+In its current implementation, SafeStack provides precise protection against
+stack-based buffer overflows, but protection against arbitrary memory write
+vulnerabilities is probabilistic and relies on randomization and information
+hiding. The randomization is currently based on system-enforced ASLR and shares
+its known security limitations. The safe stack pointer hiding is not perfect
+yet either: system library functions such as ``swapcontext``, exception
+handling mechanisms, intrinsics such as ``__builtin_frame_address``, or
+low-level bugs in runtime support could leak the safe stack pointer. In the
+future, such leaks could be detected by static or dynamic analysis tools and
+prevented by adjusting such functions to either encrypt the stack pointer when
+storing it in the heap (as already done e.g., by ``setjmp``/``longjmp``
+implementation in glibc), or store it in a safe region instead.
+
+The `CPI paper <http://dslab.epfl.ch/pubs/cpi.pdf>`_ describes two alternative,
+stronger safe stack protection mechanisms, that rely on software fault
+isolation, or hardware segmentation (as available on x86-32 and some x86-64
+CPUs).
+
+At the moment, SafeStack assumes that the compiler's implementation is correct.
+This has not been verified except through manual code inspection, and could
+always regress in the future. It's therefore desirable to have a separate
+static or dynamic binary verification tool that would check the correctness of
+the SafeStack instrumentation in final binaries.
+
 Usage
 =====
 
-To enable SafeStack, just pass ``-fsanitize=safe-stack`` flag to both compile and link
-command lines.
+To enable SafeStack, just pass ``-fsanitize=safe-stack`` flag to both compile
+and link command lines.
 
 Supported Platforms
 -------------------
 
 SafeStack was tested on Linux, FreeBSD and MacOSX.
 
 Low-level API
 -------------

 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 Use ``__attribute__((no_sanitize("safe-stack")))`` on a function declaration
 to specify that the safe stack instrumentation should not be applied to that
 function, even if enabled globally (see ``-fsanitize=safe-stack`` flag). This
 attribute may be required for functions that make assumptions about the
 exact layout of their stack frames.
 
-Care should be taken when using this attribute. The return address is not
-protected against stack buffer overflows, and it is easier to leak the
-address of the safe stack to memory by taking the address of a local variable.
-
+All local variables in functions with this attribute will be stored on the safe
+stack. The safe stack remains unprotected against memory errors when accessing
+these variables, so extra care must be taken to manually ensure that all such
+accesses are safe. Furthermore, the addresses of such local variables should
+never be stored on the heap, as it would leak the location of the SafeStack.
 
 ``__builtin___get_unsafe_stack_ptr()``
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 This builtin function returns current unsafe stack pointer of the current
 thread.
 
 ``__builtin___get_unsafe_stack_start()``
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 This builtin function returns a pointer to the start of the unsafe stack of the
 current thread.
 
 Design
 ======
 
-Please refer to
-`http://dslab.epfl.ch/proj/cpi/ <http://dslab.epfl.ch/proj/cpi/>`_ for more
-information about the design of the SafeStack and its related technologies.
-
+Please refer to the `Code-Pointer Integrity <http://dslab.epfl.ch/proj/cpi/>`_
+project page for more information about the design of the SafeStack and its
+related technologies.
 
 Publications
 ------------
 
 `Code-Pointer Integrity <http://dslab.epfl.ch/pubs/cpi.pdf>`_.
 Volodymyr Kuznetsov, Laszlo Szekeres, Mathias Payer, George Candea, R. Sekar, Dawn Song.
 USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
 (`OSDI <https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi14>`_), Broomfield, CO, October 2014