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Differential D86264

Fix spelling errors in the doc
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Authored by YangZhihui on Aug 19 2020, 10:57 PM.

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YangZhihui requested review of this revision.Aug 19 2020, 10:57 PM
YangZhihui created this revision.
YangZhihui abandoned this revision.Aug 20 2020, 7:43 PM

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clang/docs/ClangCommandLineReference.rst

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Only run preprocess and compilation steps Only run preprocess and compilation steps
.. option:: -c, --compile .. option:: -c, --compile
Only run preprocess, compile, and assemble steps Only run preprocess, compile, and assemble steps
.. option:: -emit-interface-stubs .. option:: -emit-interface-stubs
Generate Inteface Stub Files. Generate Interface Stub Files.
.. option:: -emit-llvm .. option:: -emit-llvm
Use the LLVM representation for assembler and object files Use the LLVM representation for assembler and object files
.. option:: -emit-merged-ifs .. option:: -emit-merged-ifs
Generate Interface Stub Files, emit merged text not binary. Generate Interface Stub Files, emit merged text not binary.
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.. option:: -fsplit-stack .. option:: -fsplit-stack
.. option:: -fstack-clash-protection .. option:: -fstack-clash-protection
Enable stack clash protection Enable stack clash protection
.. option:: -fstack-protector, -fno-stack-protector .. option:: -fstack-protector, -fno-stack-protector
Enable stack protectors for some functions vulnerable to stack smashing. This uses a loose heuristic which considers functions vulnerable if they contain a char (or 8bit integer) array or constant sized calls to alloca , which are of greater size than ssp-buffer-size (default: 8 bytes). All variable sized calls to alloca are considered vulnerable. A function witha stack protector has a guard value added to the stack frame that is checked on function exit. The guard value must be positioned in the stack frame such that a buffer overflow from a vulnerable variable will overwrite the guard value before overwriting the function's return address. The reference stack guard value is stored in a global variable. Enable stack protectors for some functions vulnerable to stack smashing. This uses a loose heuristic which considers functions vulnerable if they contain a char (or 8bit integer) array or constant sized calls to alloca , which are of greater size than ssp-buffer-size (default: 8 bytes). All variable sized calls to alloca are considered vulnerable. A function with a stack protector has a guard value added to the stack frame that is checked on function exit. The guard value must be positioned in the stack frame such that a buffer overflow from a vulnerable variable will overwrite the guard value before overwriting the function's return address. The reference stack guard value is stored in a global variable.
.. option:: -fstack-protector-all .. option:: -fstack-protector-all
Enable stack protectors for all functions Enable stack protectors for all functions
.. option:: -fstack-protector-strong .. option:: -fstack-protector-strong
Enable stack protectors for some functions vulnerable to stack smashing. Compared to -fstack-protector, this uses a stronger heuristic that includes functions containing arrays of any size (and any type), as well as any calls to alloca or the taking of an address from a local variable Enable stack protectors for some functions vulnerable to stack smashing. Compared to -fstack-protector, this uses a stronger heuristic that includes functions containing arrays of any size (and any type), as well as any calls to alloca or the taking of an address from a local variable
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